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Exposition of the Question of the Meaning of Being
Ⅰ. THE NECESSITY, STRUCTURE, AND PRIORITY OF THE QUESTION OF BEING
1. The necessity for explicitly restating the question of Being
2. The formal structure of the question of Being
3. The ontological priority of the question of Being
4. The ontical priority of the question of Being
Ⅱ. THE TWOFOLD TASK IN WORKING OUT THE QUESTION OF BEING.. METHOD AND DESIGN
OF OUR INVESTIGATION
5. The ontological analytic of Dasein as laying bare the horizon for an Int
erpretation of the meaning of Being in general
6. The task of Destroying the history of ontology
7. The phenomenological method of investigation
A. The concept of phenomenon
B. The concept of the logos
C. The preliminary conception of phenomenology
8. Design of the treatise
Part One
The Interpretation of Dasein in Terms of Temporality, and the Explication of T
ime as the Transcendental Horizon for the Question of Being
DIVISION ONE: PREPARATORY FUNDAMENTAL ANALYSIS OF DASEIN
Ⅰ. EXPOSITION OF THE TASK OF A PREPARATORY ANALYSIS OF DASEIN
9. The theme of the analytic of Dasein
10. How the analytic of Dasein is to be distinguished from anthropology, ps
ychology, and biology
11. The existential analytic and the Interpretation of primitive Dasein. Th
e difficulties of achieving a ‘natural conception of the world’
Ⅱ. BEING-IN-THE-WORLD IN GENERAL AS THE BASIC STATE OF DASEIN
12. A preliminary sketch of Being-in-the-world, in terms of an orientation
towards Being-in as such
13. A founded mode in which Being-in is exemplified. Knowing the world
Ⅲ. THE WORLDHOOD OF THE WORLD
14. The idea of the worldhood of the world in general
A. Analysis of environmentality and worldhood in general
15. The Being of the entities encountered in the environment
16. How the worldly character of the environment announces itself in entiti
es within-the-world
17. Reference and signs
18. Involvement and significance: the worldhood of the world
B. A contrast between our analysis of worldhood and Descartes’ Interpret
ation of the world
19. The definition of the ‘world’ as res extensa
20. Foundations of the ontological definition of the ‘world’
21. Hermeneutical discussion of the Cartesian ontology of the ‘world’
C. The aroundness of the environment, and Dasein’s spatiality
22. The spatiality of the ready-to-hand within-the-world
23. The spatiality of Being-in-the-world
24. Space, and Dasein’s spatiality
Ⅳ. BEING-IN-THE-WORLD AS BEING-WITH AND BEING-ONE’S-SELF. THE ‘THEY’
25. An approach to the existential question of the “who” of Dasein
26. The Dasein-with of Others, and everyday Being-with
27. Everyday Being-one’s-Self and the “they”
Ⅴ. BEING-IN AS SUCH
28. The task of a thematic analysis of Being-in
A. The existential Constitution of the “there”
29. Being-there as state-of-mind
30. Fear as a mode of state-of-mind
31. Being-there as understanding
32. Understanding and interpretation
33. Assertion as a derivative mode of interpretation
34. Being-there and discourse. Language
B. The everyday Being of the “there”, and the falling of Dasein
35. Idle talk
36. Curiosity
37. Ambiguity
38. Falling and thrownness
Ⅵ. CARE AS THE BEING OF DASEIN
39. The question of the primordial totality Dasein’s structural whole
40. The basic state-of-mind of anxiety as a distinctive way in which Dasein
is disclosed
41. Dasein’s Being as care
42. Confirmation of the existential Interpretation of Dasein as care in ter
ms of Dasein’s pre-onto-logical way of interpreting itself
43. Dasein, worldhood, and Reality
(a) Reality as a problem of Being, and whether the ‘external world’ can
be proved
(b) Reality as an ontological problem
(c) Reality and care
44. Dasein, disclosedness, and truth
(a) The traditional conception of truth, and its ontological foundations
(b) The primordial phenomenon of truth and the derivative character of th
e traditional conception of truth
(c) The kind of Being which truth possesses, and the presupposition of tr
uth
DIVISION TWO: DASEIN AND TEMPORALITY
45. The outcome of the preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein, and the
task of a primordial existential Interpretation of this entity
Ⅰ. DASEIN’S POSSIBILITY OF BEING-A-WHOLE, AND BEING-TOWORDS-DEATH
46. The seeming impossibility of getting Dasein’s Being-a-whole into our g
rasp ontologically and determining its character
47. The possibility of experiencing the death of Others, and the possibilit
y o getting a whole Dasein into our grasp
48. That which is still outstanding; the end; totality
49. How the existential analysis of death is distinguished from other possi
ble Interpretations of this phenomenon
50. Preliminary sketch of the existential-ontological structure of death
51. Being-towards-death and the everydayness of Dasein
52. Everyday Being-towards-the-end, and the full existential conception of
death
53. Existential projection of an authentic Being-towards-death
Ⅱ. DASEIN’S ATTESTATION OF AN AUTHENTIC POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING, AND RESOLUTE
NESS
54. The problem of how an authentic existentiell possibility is attested
55. The existential-ontological foundations of conscience
56. The character of conscience as a call
57. Conscience as the call of care
58. Understanding the appeal, and guilt
59. The existential Interpretation of the conscience, and the way conscienc
e is ordinarily interpreted
60. The existential structure of the authentic potentiality-for-Being which
is attested in the conscience
Ⅲ. DASEIN’S AUTHENTIC POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING-A-WHOLE, AND TEMPORALITY AS THE
ONTOLOGICAL MEANING OF CARE
61. A preliminary sketch of the methodological step from the definition of
Dasein’s authentic Being-a-whole to the laying-bare of temporality as a pheno
menon
62. Anticipatory resoluteness as the way in which Dasein’s potentiality-fo
r-Being-a-whole has existentiell authenticity
63. The hermeneutical situation at which we have arrived for Interpreting t
he meaning of the Being of care; and the methodological character of the exist
ential analytic in general
64. Care and selfhood
65. Temporality as the ontological meaning of care
66. Dasein’s temporality and the tasks arising therefrom of repeating the
existential analysis in a more primordial manner
Ⅳ. TEMPORALITY AND EVERYDAYNESS
67. The basic content of Dasein’s existential constitution, and a prelimin
ary sketch of the temporal Interpretation of it
68. The temporality of disclosedness in general
(a) The temporality of understanding
(b) The temporality of state-of-mind
(c) The temporality of falling
(d) The temporality of discourse
69. The temporality of Being-in-the-world and the problem of the transcende
nce of the world
(a) The temporality of circumspective concern
(b) The temporal meaning of the way in which circumspective concern becom
es modified into the theoretical discovery of the present-at-hand within-the-w
orld
(c) The temporal problem of the transcendence of the world
70. The temporality of the spatiality that is characteristic of Dasein
71. The temporal meaning of Dasein’s everdayness
Ⅴ. TEMPORALITY AND HISTORICALITY
72. Existential-ontological exposition of the problem of history
73. The ordinary understanding of history, and Dasein’s historizing
74. The basic constitution of historicality
75. Dasein’s historicality, and world-history
76. The existential source of historiology in Dasein’s historicality
77. The connection of the foregoing exposition of the problem of historical
ity with the researches of Wilhelm Dilthey and the ideas of Count Yorck
Ⅵ. TEMPORALITY AND WITHIN-TIME-NESS AS THE SOURCE OF THE ORDINARY CONCEPTION
OF TIME
78. The incompleteness of the foregoing temporal analysis of Dasein
79. Dasein’s temporality, and our concern with time
80. The time with which we concern ourselves, and within-time-ness
81. Within-time-ness and the genesis of the ordinary conception of time
82. A comparison of the existential-ontological connection of temporality,
Dasein, and world-time, with Hegel’s way of taking the relation between time
and spirit
(a) Hegel’s conception of time
(b) Hegel’s Interpretation of the connection between time and spirit
83. The existential-temporal analytic of Dasein, and the question of fundam
ental ontology as to the meaning of Being in general
(Translated by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson)
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